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REGULATING CABLE TELEVISION*
Nicholas P. Miller**
Alan Beals***
The evolution of cable television from a community antenna television
(CATV) system carrying only broadcast signals to a high capacity com-
munications system carrying a wide variety of television and nonvideo
services raises significant policy and legal questions about the role of gov-
ernment regulation of cable. Congress has recently considered legislation
that would limit the ability of local governments to regulate the local
cable franchise. ' Such legislation and the trend of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) to reduce federal regulation of electronic
media underscore the need for a clear definition of the appropriate regula-
tory role for government. To determine the appropriate regulatory scheme
for cable, its proper treatment under the first amendment of the Constitu-
tion must be resolved.
The National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the major cable
industry trade association, asserts in a report2 to Senator Packwood that
cable is analogous to newspapers. The NCTA argues that a cable operator
should be considered a newspaper publisher under the first amendment
and, as such, entitled to first amendment protections accorded a newspa-
per publisher, such as total editorial discretion, "without conditions and
* This article is based on a paper prepared for the National League of Cities Cable Television
Task Force, Mayor Charles Royer (Seattle), Chairman. The article was prepared with the assistance
of W. Randolph Young, of counsel, and Robert H. Ruxin, associate, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis &
Holman; and of Cynthia Pols, legislative counsel, and Susan McAdams, director, telecommunica-
tions project, National League of Cities. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
Mayor Royer presented testimony, based in part on this report, to the Subcommittee on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
on September 24, 1981. The Subcommittee was holding hearings on diversity in the media in prepa-
ration for drafting legislation.
** Partner, Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis & Holman, Washington, D.C.; B.A., University of
Washington, 1966; J.D., University of Washington, 1973.
*** Executive Director, National League of Cities; B.A., Colgate University, 1954; M.P.A.,
Syracuse University, 1955.
1. S. 898, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), as reported to the Senate floor would have prevented
local governments from regulating cable rates and from requiring cable operators to lease channels to
commercial users. The Senate, however, before passing the bill adopted an amendment sponsored by
Senator Goldwater to delete all provisions relating to local regulation of cable from the bill. 127
CONG. Rac. SI, 134-35 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1981).
2. National Cable Television Association, The First Amendment: A New Interpretation Needed
for Cable, CABLEVIStON, May 18, 1981, at 114 [hereinafter cited as NCTA Report] (originally ap-
peared as an unpublished report to Senator Packwood under the title Cable Television, Government
Regulation, and the First Amendment (Apr. 1981)).
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without requirements of access or balance. " 3 This article disputes this po-
sition and argues that, due in part to cable's monopoly position, it is more
analogous to the broadcast medium than it is to the press. Cable, how-
ever, in the final analysis is a unique communications medium and should
be treated as such for regulatory and first amendment purposes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolving Nature of Cable
Cable television originated in mountainous or sparsely populated areas
where over-the-air television reception was poor or very limited. These
older systems usually carried up to twelve channels of over-the-air televi-
sion broadcast signals received by well placed antennas (often located on
a nearby mountain) and by microwave relay. In recent years cable has
attracted significant attention in the larger cities where high quality televi-
sion signals are readily available over the air.
This growth in interest in cable is the result of rapid technological de-
velopments in the cable industry. 4 In the mid-seventies the launching of
domestic communications satellites (and the FCC's authorizing their use
for delivery of distant television signals) 5 made distributing a television
signal nationwide economically viable. 6 Satellites distribute nationally
the signals of a few independent broadcast stations (known as supersta-
tions) and other alternative television programming not available over the
air to cable systems from existing nearby broadcast stations. Initially, this
alternative programming was primarily movies. Now satellites deliver a
wide variety of entertainment services created especially for a cable audi-
ence.
7
3. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156.
4. See NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL NETWORKS, APPENDIX: RECENT TRENDS IN CABLE TELEVISION
(January 1980) [hereinafter cited as FCC REPORT, CABLE APPENDIX]. See also Hickey, The Great
Land Rush is On, TV GUIDE, July 11, 1981, at 2.
5. In Southern Satellite Sys., 62 F.C.C.2d 153 (1976), the FCC granted initial authorization to a
common carrier to use satellite rather than terrestrial microwave facilities to deliver a distant televi-
sion station signal to cable systems. In American Broadcasting Cos., 62 F.C.C.2d 901 (1976). the
FCC authorized installation of 4.5 meter receive-only satellite earth stations.
6. A satellite normally offers the technical capacity to transmit a series of television signals sim-
ultaneously to every point in the continental United States equipped with a receive-only earth station.
The number of signals is determined by the number of transponders on the satellite. To receive the
signals, the earth stations must be tuned to that satellite transponders' transmission frequency and
must also be pointed at that satellite. Ordinarily, a single earth station antenna cannot receive the
signals from more than one satellite at a time.
7. At least 33 channels of television programming are currently available through satellite-to-
cable systems. Satellites are not technically limited to entertainment programming. They can deliver
any type of electonically formatted information.
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During this same period, the transmission capacity of cable systems
has expanded significantly. Most state-of-the-art cable systems can carry
fifty-two and some even 100 or more simultaneous television channels or
other electronic information. This added transmission capacity permits a
cable system to carry multiple distant broadcast signals, 8 the new enter-
tainment programming available on satellites, and a wide variety of addi-
tional, nonentertainment communications services. 9
Cable technology will continue to evolve and offer even greater service
flexibility and transmission capacity. Within this decade, optical fiber
cable l0 will begin to replace traditional coaxial copper cable. Fiber optic
systems will have the capacity to carry hundreds of television (or equiva-
lent) channels. This decade also should see development of meaningful
two-way interactive services. 1I By 1990 a predicted twenty-eight million
homes will be wired for two-way service. 12 Cable technology will offer
8. The FCC has eliminated its restrictions on using distant broadcast signals.
9. State-of-the-art cable systems can-and many do-offer other services in addition to broad-
cast and entertainment programming. Some examples of additional services now available are:
-television channels for public and government use;
-cable operator originated programming of local interest (origination cablecasting);
-channels for educational use;
-closed circuit channels which connect local public institutions;
-specialty information channels devoted solely to financial, consumer price, or weather infor-
mation;
-all news channels;
-FM radio channels;
-children's, cultural, Spanish language, video music, or other channels devoted to special ap-
peal audiences.
10. Optical fiber cables contain one or more optical fibers through which laser light, modulated
to carry information, is transmitted.
11. An interactive cable service involves transmitting information electronically in one direction
followed by a response in the opposite direction. For example, meter reading may develop as an
economically viable interactive cable service. The cable operator would transmit a signal to a device
attached to a subscriber's meter asking for a reading. The device would then transmit the current
reading in response.
Cable service development has concentrated to date on mass audience, one-way services. The
typical cable system operates like a series of television stations. The operator picks entertainment
programming packages which will appeal to the widest number of potential cable system subscribers.
Few cable operators offer services which elicit any subscriber response other than paying their bill.
The cable industry is beginning to experiment with mass appeal services that elicit a consumer re-
sponse. Advertising is one example, since most cable channels have been free of commercials. Pay-
per-view equipment and nonentertainment services such as electronic check writing and shop-by-
cable are other examples of more direct audience involvement.
12. See CABtEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 158.
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the possibility of whole new classes of potential services. 13 Which of
these new services are actually offered over cable will depend on the mar-
ketplace. 14
B. Structure of Current Regulation
As interstate communications, cable is regulated by the FCC under the
Communications Act of 1934.15 In 1968 the Supreme Court held that
FCC regulation of cable is justified as "reasonably ancillary" to its author-
ity to regulate broadcasting. 16 The FCC has extended broadcasting's fair-
ness doctrine 7 and equal time requirements 18 to cable. 19 The FCC also
13. A few of the technical possibilities are:
-security monitoring (burglar, fire and police alarms);
-remote computer terminals providing access to a vast array of computer programs and data
bases;
-medical monitoring;
-meter reading:
-energy management:
-transactional services, e.g., home shopping and banking:
-polling:
-new highway traffic management;
-accessing selected libraries of films or video tapes;
-text retrieval:
-electronic mail delivery.
Futurists envision a "wired city" in which all homes are connected to a cable system which pro-
vides all video services. See Young, The Wired City, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, May 25. 1981. at 28.
14. Some cable services, although technically feasible, may not enjoy wide consumer demand.
Electronic mail, for example, may remain too costly to compete with delivered mail.
15. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The FCC has authority to regulate cable
systems whenever they transmit broadcast signals or other signals across state lines (e.g.. by satel-
lite).
16. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
17. The fairness doctrine "requires broadcasters to devote time to issues of public importance
and to present contrasting points of view." NCTA Report. supra note 2. at 118.
18. The equal time requirement requires that if one political candidate uses a broadcasting sta-
tion, that station must give other candidates for the same office an "equal opportunity to use the
station." Id.
19. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209 (1980). Other FCC rules for cable include:
-television broadcast signals that a cable system must carry, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-.63 (1980):
-maximum franchise fees local governments may charge, 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1980):
-nonduplication of certain television signals, 47 C.F.R. § 76.92 (1980):
-other rules analagous to broadcasting rules (personal attack, lotteries, obscenity). 47 C.F.R. §§
76.209-215 (1980);
-equal employment opportunity rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.311 (1980);
-cross-ownership proscriptions on certain television broadcast and telephone company interests.
47 C.F.R. §§ 63.55, 76.501 (1980);
-technical operation standards for cable systems, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.601-.617 (1980):
-sports blackout rules, 47 C.F.R. § 76.67 (1980).
The FCC also recommends some local franchising procedures and provisions. These include a
maximum 15-year franchise period, prompt construction, consumer protection provisions, and a pub-
lic franchising process affording due process. Note to 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1980).
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required cable operators to dedicate some channels for public, govern-
mental, educational, and leased access. The Supreme Court, however,
held in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.20 that these access requirements
were outside of the FCC's authority because they were not "reasonably
ancillary" to regulating broadcasting.
Since the FCC no longer regulates many aspects of cable, state and
local regulation has the greatest effect on cable operators, and is the regu-
lation that they would most like to avoid. 21 Some states regulate cable
directly but most rely on local government to perform all nonfederal regu-
lation. Typically a local government enacts a franchise ordinance22 estab-
lishing the basic framework for the community's regulation and address-
ing local aspects of cable operation. 23 Local governments usually require
cable operators to set aside some channels for local use-local access
programming-and for commercial leasing to cable programmers-
leased access-- as well as for other uses similar to those the FCC required
before Midwest Video.24
The issues being debated between the cable industry and the municipal-
ities are threefold. First, given the increasing variety of services cable is
offering to subscribers and to the community, which functions performed
by cable raise issues of first amendment rights? Are these individual func-
tions analogous to newspapers, to broadcasting, or to something else?
Second, do the cable operators' first amendment rights preclude federal,
state, and local regulation of content, as in the fairness doctrine, and of
structure, as in access requirements? Do the first amendment rights of
other speakers and of the viewer support or require some government in-
20. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Court did not reach the question whether FCC regulation of cable
violated cable operators' first amendment rights, but noted that the issue was "not frivolous." Id. at
709 n. 19.
21. See note I and accompanying text supra.
22. In a few communities the cable system is actually owned and operated by the local govern-
ment or its instrumentality. There are at least 28 municipally-owned cable systems. MacKenna, The
Cabling of America: What about Municipal Ownership?, 70 NATIONAL Civic REV. 307, 310 (1981).
San Bruno, California is the largest municipality operating a cable system. MacKenna advises muni-
cipalities to consider cable ownership as a source of revenue. He suggests, however, that small muni-
cipalities may be more successful cable system owners than large cities. Id. at 330.
23. Franchise ordinances vary from community to community but most include:
-use of public right-of-way;
-maximum subscriber rates;
-franchise fees (normally three to-five percent of the cable system's gross revenue);
-service areas;
-minimum number of channels;
-minimum signal carriage requirements;
-access channel requirements.
24. See NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 150 (Code of Good Cable Television Franchising Con-
duct urges cities to assure "local public, community, educational, municipal, and leased cable ac-
cess").
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tervention? And third, are first amendment rights of cable operators di-
minished or waived by their voluntary contractual agreements to provide
services, such as local access, when they bid on and win a local cable
franchise?
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CABLE
Cable operators decide what information is transmitted over cable sys-
tems, which programmers and service providers may use the system, and
what uses of the system may occur without the operator's consent. Only
federal, state, and local regulations limit the operator's absolute control
and insure rights of access to the system for users other than the opera-
tor. 25
Government has two primary objectives in regulating cable: to protect
the public interest and to facilitate the rapid development of an increasing
variety of valuable public communication services. Developing an appro-
priate regulatory framework to meet these objectives depends to a large
degree on the status of cable under the first amendment. Cable's first
amendment status cannot be defined until legislatures and courts develop
answers to complex policy questions. What are the first amendment rights
of cable operators, subscribers, and the public? What first amendment
values can regulating cable enhance positively or frustrate inappropri-
ately?
Two guiding principles underlie first amendment standards. First, the
first amendment preserves a free press in order to provide people with a
robust and wide-ranging debate on public issues. The Constitution does
not preserve a free press for the economic or psychological gratification
of publishers and editors. Under the Constitution the rights of the reader,
listener, and viewer are paramount and the print and broadcast media
must act in ways not always consistent with the media's economic interest
when those interests conflict with the audience's interests.2 6
Second, the first amendment affects each communication medium in a
unique way. The Supreme Court has developed distinct first amendment
standards for each communication medium that take into account the
unique characteristics of each medium. 27 As Justice Jackson stated in Ko-
vacs v. Cooper: "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper,
25. See notes 15- 24 and accompanying text supra.
26. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). But see Baldasty & Simpson.
The Deceptive 'Right to Know': How Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment, 56 WASI. L. REV.
365 (1981).
27. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 736, 748 (1978): Southeastern Promotions. Ltd. v.
Conrad. 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367. 386 (1969).
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the handbill, the sound truck and the street comer orator have differing
natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my view, is'a law unto
itself .... -28 In the same case, Justice Frankfurter criticized the use of
loose analogies and broad first amendment theories:
Some of the arguments made in this case strikingly illustrate how easy it is
to fall into the ways of mechanical jurisprudence through the use of over-
simplified formulas. It is argued that the Constitution protects freedom of
speech: Freedom of speech means the right to communicate, whatever the
physical means for so doing; sound trucks are one form of communication;
ergo that form is entitled to the same protection as any other means of com-
munication, whether by tongue or pen. Such sterile argumentation treats
society as though it consisted of bloodless categories. The various forms of
modem so-called "mass communications" raise issues that were not implied
in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin and
Jefferson and Madison .... Movies have created problems not presented by
the circulation of books, pamphlets, or newspapers. . . .Broadcasting in
turn has produced its brood of complicated problems hardly to be solved by
an easy formula about the preferred position of free speech. 29
Cable may now be added to Justice Frankfurter's list of media deserving
finely tuned first amendment standards rather than "oversimplified formu-
las."
A. The Functions of Cable
To understand how the first amendment should affect the regulation of
cable television, it is necessary to analyze cable's characteristics. This
section will review cable's functional characteristics and compare them to
the characteristics of other media. 30 Subsequent sections will discuss the
significance of these characteristics and distinctions in determining the
proper first amendment approach to cable.
1. Local Television Broadcast and Access Programming
One function a cable operator performs is to retransmit local television
broadcast signals without changing the format or content of the broad-
28. 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (concurring opinion).
29. Id. at 96 (concurring opinion) (citations omitted).
30. For purposes of analysis, NCTA's characterization of a newspaper operation as compared to
a cable operation will be used: "The [cable] operator, like a newspaper editor, must exercise editorial
judgment and control, deciding what is shown and what is not, and what editorial policies are appro-
priate." NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 114.
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casts. FCC rules require this function. 31 The cable operator also transmits
local access programming 32 without exercising any control over the pro-
gramming. Franchise agreements with local governments often require
this function. The operator's role is usually limited to plugging video
tapes into playback recorders according to a prearranged schedule. The
lack of editorial control in carrying out this function distinguishes the op-
erator from a newspaper publisher. Instead, the operator's position is sim-
ilar to that of a common carrier in that the operator has no control over the
information transmitted, does not select it, and cannot discriminate
among users eligible for access under the mandatory signal carriage and
local access requirements.
2. Pay and Distant Signal Television Programming
Another category of service provided by cable systems is carrying dis-
tant television signals. Satellites currently transmit the signals of three
television superstations to cable systems nationally and relay other signals
regionally. Cable operators select these signals and retransmit them. For-
merly, these distant signals were relayed to the cable headend 33 by a mi-
crowave system. Satellite transmission services have opened a new class
of nonbroadcast programming developed specifically for cable systems.
Some of these programs are provided to cable operators free of charge,
and at least one service pays operators to carry its signals. 34 Other pro-
grams, known as pay television or pay cable, are sold to operators on a
per cable subscriber basis.
The cable system operator exercises no content control over these dis-
tant television signals. 35 The cable operator's role is limited to selecting
31. 47C.F.R.§§76.51-.63(1980).
32. Local access programming includes programming provided by individuals or groups in the
community, educational institutions, and governmental entities.
33. The cable headend is the cable system facility used to control and insert signals into the
distribution cable. It typically includes an antenna for receiving over-the-air signals, microwave or
satellite earth station reception facilities, or both, and necessary system controls.
34. Services that are offered free to cable systems include religious broadcasting network signals
and some services supported entirely by advertising. The ESPN network will compensate operators
for carrying its signal. See ESPN to Compensate Operators, CABLEVISION. Aug. 3, 1981. at 14.
If cable systems carry distant over-the-air broadcast signals. then they are subject to compulsory
copyright licensing fees. 17 U.S.C. § 11I (1976).
35. FCC rules require under certain circumstances that distant broadcast signals not simultane-
ously duplicate a local signal. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.92-. 161 (1980). Therefore, certain portions of
the distant signal may have to be excised by the cable operator. Local spot announcements may also
be inserted by the operator. FCC rules treat imported nonbroadcast signals as cablecasting and sub-
ject them to the same broadcast type regulation as origination cablecasting under 47 C.F.R. §§
76.205-.221 (1980). However, the FCC apparently did not anticipate applying such regulations to
distant signals at the time it promulgated the rules nor do the rules appear to serve any useful purpose
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the signal and assigning it a channel. Agreements to retransmit the distant
signals typically prohibit the cable operator from deleting or changing any
portion of the programming provided. 36 In contrast, newspaper publish-
ers usually retain editorial control over the content of stories writteh by
wire services, syndicated columnists, and even comic strips. As with
local retransmission, distant signal carriage bears little relationship to the
operation of a newspaper.
3. Informational Services
Other cable system channels provide textual information, such as time,
weather, stock prices, grocery and other consumer price information, and
news wire reports. A few advanced cable systems are experimenting with
a new textual service which enables subscribers to access a large informa-
tion library. These new informational channels bear a superficial resem-
blance to an electronic newspaper because they present text that reads like
newspaper stories. Nevertheless, the functions of a cable operator in pre-
senting this information and the functions of a newspaper publisher are
not alike.
The publisher of a newspaper has editorial control over the newspa-
per's contents, aside from stock market reports and other similar informa-
tion which represent a very small percentage of space in most newspa-
pers. In comparison, the cable operator has almost no editorial control
over the content of the information channels. The cable operator merely
selects the category of information or service offered. The operator's role
is limited to deciding which information source or service will be used.
The operator does not control the content of even the new text services
which are designed, assembled, edited, and maintained by service com-
panies for direct sale to cable subscribers. The cable operator is merely a
passive transmitter of this information.
If cable systems were to transmit the actual text of a newspaper, then
the subscriber would receive an electronic newspaper. But the newspaper
editors, not the cable operator, would still control the newspaper's con-
tent. The operator's role would be limited to deciding which newspa-
per(s) would have access to the system's subscribers and would not in-
due to the predominately entertainment nature of the programming and the practical lack of control by
the local cable operator. See Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Cable
Television and the Political Broadcasting Laws: The 1980 Election Experience and Proposals for
Change (Jan. 1981) (unpublished report to Senator Goldwater).
36. A few cable operators, especially those with very limited channel capacity, try to "cherry
pick" or select programs from several nonpremium services. Programmers, especially those sup-
ported by advertising, discourage this practice if they cannot prohibit it contractually. See, e.g.,
ESPN to Compensate Operators, CABLEVISION, Aug. 3, 1981, at 14.
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clude control of the content of the text of the transmitted newspapers. The
cable operator's first amendment status would be similar to that of a
newsstand operator: the operator could choose what newspapers to
transmit just as a newstand operator can determine what newspapers to
sell. Neither has control over the content of those they select.
Cable operators would take on the attributes of newspaper publishers
only if they were to compose and edit their own electronic newspaper.
Even then, such attributes would apply to the cable operators only for the
newspaper channel, not the entire cable operation.
4. Origination Cablecasting
The cable operator has control over programming on channels that are
not used for carrying local television broadcasting signals and local ac-
cess programming. As discussed, the operator may select other packaged
services for those channels. On some channels, however, the operator
may have exclusive control over the programming. If the operator pro-
duces origination cablecast 37 programming, the operator can assemble
original news, entertainment, and other local programming, including ed-
itorials. In this origination cablecasting function the operator behaves like
a local broadcaster and must comply with most of the FCC rules imposed
on broadcasters. The cablecast programming must comply with the fair-
ness doctrine, personal attack, and equal time requirements and is subject
to limitations on lotteries, obscenity, and sponsorship identification. 38
The origination cablecaster has the same copyright interests in this pro-
gramming as broadcasters have in their programs. The only real differ-
ence between origination cablecasting and broadcasting is how the pro-
gramming is transmitted-the broadcaster uses the limited radio
frequency spectrum while the cable operator uses the closed access coax-
ial cable. The origination cablecaster is no more like a newspaper than is
a local television broadcaster.
B. Assessing Cable's Unique First Amendment Status: Policy Aspects
Several major public policy issues establish the framework for assess-
ing cable's first amendment status. These include cable's monopoly posi-
tion in each community, concentration of cable system ownership, access
37. Cablecasting is defined by the FCC rules as programming exclusive of broadcast signals.
Origination cablecasting is defined as programming subject to the exclusive control of the cable oper-
ator. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (1980).
38. 47C.F.R. §§76.205-.221 (1980).
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rights for programmers and service providers other than the operator,
content regulation, and cable's use of the public right-of-way.
Examining these issues is necessary because first amendment standards
and obligations are not applied in a vacuum, but rather exist in the context
of practical considerations. 39 The limits on an individual's first amend-
ment rights are generally those necessary to protect the rights of other
individuals or important public concerns.4 0 For example, a person's free
speech right does not entitle that person to publish obscene material or
make libelous statements .41 Each of the public policy issues most relevant
to cable is explained briefly in turn.
1. Cable's Monopoly Position
Although a cable operation rarely holds an exclusive franchise, compe-
tition between two systems in the same area is practically nonexistent. In
only about six of more than 6,000 cable systems in the United States does
one operator compete with another operator for the same subscribers. 42
Once a system is built, a second operator normally will not build a sepa-
rate system to serve the same subscribers because of the economics of
cable. Typically, forty to fifty-five percent of the homes passed by a cable
system subscribe. Since this is only about ten percent more than the pene-
tration rate usually considered the breakeven point for operating a system
profitably, 43 two systems can rarely survive in the same geographic area.
Furthermore, financing a second system will be difficult because the oper-
ator of the existing system may be well enough established to reduce
rates. Since the initial construction costs of a cable system are high, re-
quiring heavy capital investment and financing costs, this will force the
second operator either to charge rates that are below these costs or to go
out of business.
The cable operators' monopoly is based on their control over the con-
duit into each home and business. Like the local telephone company,
cable is a conduit for transmitting services into homes and businesses.
39. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-88 (1949).
40. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444,447 (1969).
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
42. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, No. 80-
1882 (10th Cir. Dec. 24, 1980). See also Mini Cable Systems in Dallas: Small Fish in a Big Pond,
CABLEVISION, Aug. 3, 1981, at 23; New York May Experiment with Overbuilding in Boroughs, CA.
BLEVISION, July 20, 1981, at 12; DawsoriHeiw Safe is Cable's "NaturalMonopoly"?, CABLEVISION,
June 1, 1981 at 333, 340; FCC REPORT, CABLE APPENDIX, supra note, at 11.
43. See Cable Economic Inquiry, 79'F.C.C.2d 663, 686 (1980) (discussion of system breakeven
penetration rates and demand for basic cable television service).
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But the two-way services offered by new technology will make it a con-
duit for transmitting communications fron homes and businesses as well.
Although a consumer may obtain many of the cable services from other
sources, no other technology offers the bundle of communications ser-
vices provided by cable. 44 The cable system usually carries or duplicates
every other television service available in the community at the time the
cable system was built. Unless the cable operator consents, however, new
over-the-air television services such as low power television and sub-
scription television will not be transmitted on the cable system.
45
Local governments typically protect their citizens from cable's mono-
poly power by regulating rates for basic subscriber services, insuring ac-
cess for users on a nondiscriminatory basis, and setting minimum service
standards.
2. Concentration of Control
The first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is es-
sential to the welfare of the public." 46 Congress and the FCC have imple-
mented this constitutional principle by encouraging competition and pre-
venting concentration of control in the media. For example, the
Newspaper Preservation Act of 197047 facilitates continued editorial
44. Video programming received through other media. e.g., free broadcast television, subscrip-
tion television, multipoint distribution service, and direct broadcast satellites. cannot easily compete
with a cable television system for viewers within homes that subscribe to the cable system. A televi-
sion set, once attached to a cable system, usually cannot be tuned to receive a service that is not
carried on the cable system unless a special switch is installed. Moreover, these other media cannot
offer the variety and number of channels received through cable. Nor do these other media have a
significant potential for two-way user interaction. As a recent report on competition among media
services in the Dallas market noted:
While three STV [subscription television] operations and one MDS [multipoint distribution]
service are waging a frantic battle for the Dallas TV viewer, their strides are considered to be
only temporary. Because of the high rates and limited services STV and MDS offer. Warner [the
franchise owner] does not expect these services to hinder substantially the success it will have
with the 80-channel system it plans to build and is scheduled to launch in four years.
Mini Cable Systems in Dallas: Small Fish in a Big Pond, CABLEVISION, Aug. 3, 1981. at 23.
The local telephone system can provide some two-way services, but it is not likely to match the
cost effective potential of cable for two-way transmission of data between thousands of outlying
terminals and a central point.
45. The FCC does not require cable systems to carry subscription television stations. 47 C.F.R. §
76.64 (1980). The FCC's proposed rules for low power television would not apply cable "must
carry" rules to that service. Low Power Television Broadcasting, 82 F.C.C.2d 47. 60 n.31 (1980).
46. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1. 20 (1945).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976). Under that Act, if the Attorney General consents, then a
failing newspaper may enter into a joint operating arrangement with a competitive paper in the same
community without incurring antitrust liability. See Barnette. Some Failing Newspapers Fitd Uncle
Sam a Pal. WASINGTON POST, July 24, 1981, at Al l, col. 1.
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dompetition between newspapers even though one of the newspapers in a
community is facing economic failure. The FCC will not grant an entity
more than one license for television broadcast service in a market, limits
an entity to seven television licenses nationwide, and limits the cross-
ownership of a television or radio station and a daily newspaper in the
same community. 48 The FCC also proscribes cross-ownership between a
cable operator and a broadcast television station (or national network) or
telephone company in the same community. 49
Cable has the potential to make widely available a diversity of commu-
nications. The emerging ownership structure of the cable industry, how-
ever, may prevent realization of that potential. Many of the same factors
that led to the present federal policy of limiting ownership concentration
in other media are evident in the ownership structure of cable. Each cable
operator, subject only to its particular franchise requirements, has control
over who uses the system's channels and what services and programming
are provided over the system. 50 This potential control of a wide range of
electronic communications in a community contrasts with a broadcaster's
limited control of one electronic voice. The broadcaster controls only the
single frequency channel assigned under an FCC license. As cable sub-
scribers increase and the number of homes and businesses with alternative
electronic communications access decreases, the ownership concentration
issues will assume even greater significance.
Another ownership concentration problem is caused by the growing ac-
quisition of cable systems by large operators who own many systems. In
1970, the largest twenty-five cable system operators served only 46.7%
of all cable system subscribers in the United States. 51 By 1980 the figure
was 68%.52 Federal law does not place any limit on multiple system own-
ership. 53 This concentration problem is exacerbated by the increase in
vertical integration of the multiple system operators, as they develop an
48. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, .240, .636 (1980).
49. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.55, 76.501 (1980). The FCC occasionally waives the telephone-cable
cross-ownership prohibition in rural areas. See Telephone Co.-CATV Cross-ownership Rules, 84
F.C.C.2d 335 (1980) (notice of proposed rulemaking). It recently granted a waiver of the network-
cable ownership proscription to permit CBS to own cable systems serving no more than 90,000 sub-
scribers or 0.5% of the nation's cable television subscribers, whichever is less. TELEVISION DIGT,
Aug. 10, 1981, at4.
50. The cable operator will not always choose to control the information on every channel but
will presumably select the signal or user for each channel.
51. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE DATA 6 (1972).
52. Calculated from statistics in TELEVISION DIGEST, CABLE AND STATION COVERAGE ATLAs 4a;
12a (1980-81).
53. See, e.g., Cablecom Gen., Inc., No. 81-265 (F.C.C. June 11, 1981) (Commissioner Wash-
bum, concurring).
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extensive capacity to produce programs. 54 This vertical integration gives
them additional power over the content of programs, the prices paid by
cable operators for the programs, 55 and access of competing programmers
to their systems. 56 Additionally, ownership of cable by other media is a
growing phenomenon. 57 The FCC does not limit this cross-media owner-
ship except where it proscribes cable ownership by broadcast television
stations in the same market.
The monopoly position of cable operators in the geographic area served
by the system, their control over a single distribution system with multi-
channel capacity, and the growth in horizontal and vertical integration
and in cross-media ownership raise significant public policy questions. It
is a risky proposition to rely on potential competition to deter abuses by
national conglomerates in the cable industry. During a similar period of
governmental neglect between 1907 and 1921, Theodore Vail assimilated
a number of monopolistic local telecommunications companies into the
largest, most monopolistic corporation in the United States today, Ameri-
54. In 1979. four pay cable programmer/packagers producing programs for approximately 85%
of the pay cable subscribers in the U.S. were owned by or affiliated with cable operators serving
approximately 20% of the nation's cable subscribers. No system owned by a pay programmer had an
affiliation with any programmer other than its corporate relative. FCC REPORT. CABLE APPENDIX.
supra note 4, at 35-36. See also note 57 infra.
55. Unlike an independent program producer, a producer related to a cable operator is assured of
a market for its programming in affiliated cable systems. Thus, a cable related producer has greater
flexibility in pricing its products for use by nonaffiliated cable systems.
56. FCC Commissioner James R. Fogarty recently expressed concern over the trend toward ver-
tical integration in cable systems. FCC NEws, July 31. 1981, at I (separate statement of Commis-
sioner Fogarty on FCC approval of transfer of control of Teleprompter Corporation to Westinghouse
Broadcasting Company). He said that vertical integration of cable systems held the potential for anti-
competitive conduct if vertically integrated cable operators did not provide full and open access to
their systems. For example:
[A] vertically integrated cable operator may refuse to distribute programming from other compa-
nies in order to preclude competition with services offered by its own affiliated program sup-
plier. For example, HBO might be dropped to promote Showtime. or CNN might be dropped to
promote a new Group W news service, thereby eliminating competition at the local level. If this
should in fact occur, the subscribers to these cable systems would be denied a measure of pro-
gram choice and program suppliers would be denied the ability to compete directly for the pa-
tronage of those subscribers.
Id. The Commissioner conceded that vertical integration is a fact of life in the cable system. Never-
theless, he noted that a 1974 Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications had concluded that a
policy preventing system operators from owning the programs they distribute would best serve the
public interest. Id.
57. In 1979 some 78.6% of all cable systems were owned by corporations with other media
interests. This figure represents a 3. 1% increase in such cross-media ownership over 1978. The fol-
lowing cross-media ownership patterns were reported in 1979: broadcasters-32.8%: program pro-
ducers and distributors- 17.6%; newspapers- 13. 1%; book or magazine publishers- 11. 1 %: and
theatre-4.0%. TELEVISION DIGEST, CABLE AND STATION COVERAGE ATLAS 12a (1980-81). See also
Baker, Broadcast Groups Turning Collision Course with Cable Into High Road to Profitabilitv. CA-
BLEVISION, Mar. 23. 1981. at 40-47.
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can Telephone & Telegraph Company. 58 Thoughtful analysis of the ap-
propriate relationship between evolving communications media and the
government is a prerequisite today for developing policy on concentration
of control.
3. Use of the Public Right-of-Way
A cable operator, like the telephone and electric power companies,
must string the system's cable on utility poles or use underground cables
or ducts. These pole-line or underground facilities are usually located in a
public right-of-way or street, or traverse private property under public
utility easements. The public has a substantial interest in requiring that
the construction, maintenance, and use of utility poles and the digging up
of city streets or private land under easement rights meet aesthetic, safety,
and convenience standards. Local governments typically require a cable
operator to get a permit for such public utility-type privileges. 59
Even if a cable system were not a natural monopoly, the limited avail-
ability of space for pole attachments and underground ducts in many com-
munities would preclude the existence of more than one cable system.60
When several service providers wish to offer services to the public but
physical limitations permit only one to offer services, the local govern-
ment is obligated to impose conditions on the permit that will insure that
the community receives the services most nearly equivalent to those
which would have been offered had there been no physical limit on com-
petition.61
58. See J. BROOKS, TELEPHONE: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1976).
59. Private individuals have no inherent right to conduct private business along public rights-of-
way. The right of state or local governments to require permits for encroachment and to assign condi-
tions to such use has been universally upheld. Moreover, such permits are revocable at any time, and
no right to use the street for private purposes can be acquired except by prescription from the munici-
pality. 10 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 30.48-.52 (3d ed. 1981). See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) ("We have consistently recognized the strong interest of
state and local governments in regulating the use of their streets and other public places.").
60. Utility poles and underground duct space represent major construction expenses. Existing
utility poles frequently have little if any additional space besides electric and telephone cables. For
example, the FCC assumes a typical 35-foot utility pole to have 17 feet of usable space which, con-
sidering electrical interference, placement, and safety space requirements for three cables (one tele-
phone, one electric, and one cable television), is insufficient to accommodate a fourth cable without
substantial rearrangement or replacement. See Pole Attachments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 71 (1979).
61. See F. WELCH, PUBLIC UTILrrY REGULATION 76-78 (1968), for a discussion of the conveni-
ence and necessity certification requirements of state and federal law. See generally NEW YORK
STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE TELEVISION FRANCHISING WORKBOOK chs. 4, 5
(1980).
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4. Access Rights
Because of cable's monopoly position, access to the cable system for
parties other than the cable operator needs to be insured in order to main-
tain distribution of a wide range of communications services on a compet-
itive basis with minimal entry barriers to new service providers. Cable
operators, free of regulatory constraints, are likely to maximize profits by
using their monopoly and monopsony powers. On the basis of their mo-
nopoly position, cable operators can set the prices charged to subscribers
for services largely free of all market constraints and limited only by the
consumers' elasticity of demand. As monopsonists, operators are able to
control the prices charged to users for access to the cable system. By
using the pricing mechanism in a discriminatory fashion to exclude com-
petitive services from the system, operators have the power to determine
which service providers and programmers can have access to the cable
system.
A logical limit on the operator's power is to require the operator to
allow reasonable access to the pipeline for others to distribute competing
services, whether entertainment or public affairs programming, data dis-
tribution or two-way interactive services. Government currently imposes
two general access requirements on cable systems to insure access for
some competitive services. The FCC requires that cable systems must
carry the unaltered signals of local television broadcast stations, 62 and
many franchise agreements require cable operators to provide channels
for community, educational, governmental, and commercial leased ac-
cess on a nondiscriminatory basis. 6 3 These access requirements are predi-
cated on the assumption that persons other than the cable operator should
have some rights to use the cable system.
5. Content Regulation
In regulating programming content, the FCC recognizes the need for
cable programming that serves the interests of the community. The FCC
imposes content regulation on cablecast programming similar to that ap-
plied to broadcasters. This regulation includes the fairness doctrine, per-
sonal attack, and election candidate equal time rules.64 If local govern-
ments have the authority to guarantee access to channels for individuals
62. See note 31 supra.
63. The FCC has deleted its minimum access requirements which were struck down as beyond
the Commission's authority under the Communications Act in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689 (1979). Cable TV Access Channel Rules, 83 F.C.C.2d 197 (1981).
64. See note 38 supra. See also note 31 supra (FCC rules require carrying most local TV sig-
nals).
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and groups, then perhaps no broadcast-type content regulation of cable
may be necessary. This concept is discussed below. 65
C. The Cable Operator's First Amendment Status as Determined by
Function
Cable performs many functions, and the cable operator's control of the
content of the communications differs from function to function. Because
cable's first amendment status differs for each of these functions, the first
amendment rights of the cable operator, cable program supplier, and
cable viewer should be analyzed separately for each function. An analysis
by function avoids overgeneralization and provides the flexibility to ad-
dress new functions that may develop without having to reevaluate the
cable system as a whole.
There are three basic categories of operator control relevant for first
amendment purposes: no control over content, selection control over con-
tent, and exclusive control over content. The no-control category includes
mandatory broadcast signals that the operator must carry, such as local
television, local access programming, and leased access programming.
Selection control includes programming and services selected by the op-
erator but over which the operator exercises no content control once the
selection is made. Examples of selection control are distant television sig-
nals and information and textual services. The exclusive control category
encompasses local origination cablecasting. The cable operator's first
amendment rights vary according to the category of content control.
1. No-Control Category
Within the no-control category, the cable operator engages in none of
the communicative, self-expressive activity which the first amendment
protects. 66 The operator exercises no control or editorial discretion over
the information, but merely provides a channel to transmit programming
or information created, controlled, and selected by others. The first
amendment protects the underlying speaker, for example the local broad-
cast station or the citizen producing a public access program. The no-
control category involves no first amendment rights for the cable opera-
65. See notes 99-124 and accompanying text infra.
66. Although the Supreme Court has not defined precisely the speech protected by the first
amendment, protected expression generally involves communication of thoughts, ideas, or emotions.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 495, 515 (1939). Moreover, protected speech does not encompass all words
or conduct intended to express an idea. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942).
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tor, however, because the cable operator is not speaking in the first
amendment sense. 67
2. Selection Control Category
Cable operators argue that their selection of a television signal or other
information for carriage on their systems is protected by the first amend-
ment. But the first amendment comes into play in this selection control
category only in limited instances and primarily protects the rights of the
viewers, not the rights of the cable operator per se. The appropriate com-
parison is not to a newspaper publisher, but a broadcaster whose license is
conditioned on serving the public interest. 68 Addressing the first amend-
ment rights of broadcasters in relation to those of the public, the Supreme
Court recently stated:
Although the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to
exercise "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public [du-
ties]," ... the Court has made clear that: "It is the right of the viewvers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance mo-
nopolization of that market .... It is the right of the public to receive suit-
able access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experi-
ences which is crucial here." 69
67. The first amendment prevents the government from requiring involuntary speech in certain
circumstances. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not constitutionally require
individual to disseminate ideological message on license plate); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state cannot compel flag salute). The Supreme Court distinguished
Woolev and Barnette, however, and held that a state can require a private shopping center owner to
allow individuals to petition on the private property. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins. 447 U.S.
74 (1980). The Court rejected the shopping center owner's argument that he had a first amendment
right not to be forced to use his property as a forum for others for three reasons. First, the views of the
speakers were unlikely to be identified as those of the owner. Second. the state does not dictate the
message to be displayed. And third, the property owner could expressly disavow any connection with
the message by posting signs disclaiming sponsorship. Id. at 87.
This reasoning applies to cable access requirements imposed by local governments. Cable opera-
tors are not required to carry a state-dictated ideological message and cable operators can present their
own views on other channels and disclaim sponsorship of views on local or leased access channels.
See text accompanying notes 69, 85-88, 99-105 infra.
68. See Communications Act of 1934. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The
FCC is empowered to issue regulations and grant licenses based on public interest, convenience, and
necessity. Id. §§ 303, 309. Similarly, a municipality authorizes a private entity (e.g.. a cable system
or a utility) to use public rights-of-way to promote the general public interest and provide service to
the public.
69. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC. 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981) (quoting Columbia
Broadcasting Sys.. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94. 110 (1973). and Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)) (emphasis by court).
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In the cable context, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
quoted Professor Meiklejohn, "'the point of ultimate interest is not the
words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers,'- 70 and further noted
that "'the right of free speech . . . does not embrace a right to snuff out
the free speech of others.' "71 If cable operators do have a right under the
first amendment to select programs, this right must be balanced against
the first amendment rights of the viewers.
Less weight should be given to the operator's rights in the selection
control category because the cable operator's selection of a particular sig-
nal does not add significantly to the message transmitted. 72 Indeed, the
cable operator's purpose in choosing programming (for example in select-
ing Home Box Office rather than Showtime) is not to participate in public
discussion or to express ideas, activities which the first amendment is pri-
marily designed to protect. 73 Rather, the operator is merely exercising a
business judgment as to which product will sell best.74 To the extent that
this judgment involves speech, that speech is related primarily to the op-
erator's economic interests and therefore receives only limited first
amendment protection. 75
Even assuming that the cable operator is "speaking" for first amend-
ment purposes when the operator selects programs for the system, this
speech act does not supersede the first amendment rights of the cable sys-
tem subscribers. Many cable franchise agreements specify television sig-
nals that the cable system must carry, and FCC rules require carrying
local television signals. 76 Such requirements generally reflect the commu-
nity's desire for diverse programming and for continuing existing televi-
70. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960)).
71. Id. at 46 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969)).
72. See id. at 49.
73. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
74. On the surface such a choice appears similar to a broadcaster's decision to affiliate with (and
carry the programs of) network A as opposed to network B. However, broadcasters are ultimately
responsible for the content of the programming they broadcast, whether network originated-or not.
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 204-06 (1943). Broadcasters rou-
tinely review network programming in advance and substitute other programming. In contrast, cable
operators exercise no such control over the signals they import (except as noted in notes 35 & 36
supra).
75. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service'Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63
(1980); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977). If the cable
operator voluntarily agrees to limit selection discretion as part of the commercial transaction of ob-
taining a franchise, the operator's first amendment arguments are weakened further. See notes
133-145 and accompanying text infra.
76. See notes 31 supra ("must carry" rules).
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sion services. 77 Operators may contract away their right to select pro-
gramming, either in a franchise agreement with the local government or
in a distribution contract with a program service provider. The local gov-
ernment, in negotiating a franchise, has the right to insure the widest pos-
sible selection of available programs on the de facto monopoly cable sys-
tem. 78 If the cable operator is committed to providing specific
programming in the franchise agreement, then the contractual rights of
the subscribers to receive that programming, as reflected in the negotiated
agreement, will prevail over any rights of the cable operator. 79
3. Exclusive Control Category
When a cable operator originates cablecast programming, the operator
controls the content of programming transmitted on that particular chan-
nel. This function raises complex first amendment questions. The two rel-
evant first amendment models are broadcasting and the print media.
These models present the issue of what the government can require from
certain classes of speakers. The government's power to require speech,
rather than to proscribe it,80 is implicit in rules imposed by the FCC such
as the fairness doctrine, personal attack, and equal time. A comparison of
these models and an analysis of why they differ will be instructive for
determining the appropriate model for cable.
a. Comparing the Newspaper Model and the Broadcast Model
The Supreme Court has zealously guarded the print media's first
amendment rights, but has not allowed the media to use their first amend-
ment rights to restrain others' first amendment rights. In Associated Press
v. United States,81 the Court held that the first amendment did not exempt
the media from antitrust laws. The Court stated that the first amendment
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
77. "Must carry" rules were developed to insure that cable would increase the broadcast service
available to a community by supplementing rather than replacing existing signals. Second Report and
Order in Docket 14895, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 736 (1966).
78. Local governments often ask for specific signals or categories of signals in their request for
proposals. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION. CABLE TELEVISION
FRANCHISING WORKBOOK 70 (1980).
79. See text accompanying notes 133-145 infra (discussion of the effect of negotiating the
franchise agreement on the cable operator's first amendment rights).
80. This analysis does not address government censorship because no such government right has
been seriously claimed for broadcasting or newspapers nor is it claimed for cablecasting. 47 U.S.C. §
326 (1976) specifically proscribes any FCC censorship or interference with the right of free speech by
radio communications.
81. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public. . . . Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for
some."'82 This suggested that a right of access to newspapers might exist.
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,83 however, the Court ruled
that a Florida statute giving a person attacked in a publication a right of
reply violated the first amendment. In Tornillo, the Court reasoned that
requiring the additional printing cost, the composing time, and the use of
scarce column space would restrain publishing. It stated that publishers
should not be compelled "to publish that which "'reason" tells them
should not be published.' "84
The Court has not extended such broad first amendment rights to
broadcasters. The Court has upheld rules that require broadcasters to pro-
vide time for airing opposing points of view or for responding to personal
attack. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 85 the Court stated:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
voices which are representative of his community and which would other-
wise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 86
The Court went on to state: "[T]he First Amendment confers no right on
licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and
no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the
Government has denied others the right to use." 87
Unfortunately, neither the Red Lion nor the Tornillo opinions analyze
and compare their different treatment of the print media and the broadcast
media under the first amendment. In Red Lion, the Court focused on the
first amendment rights of the listening or viewing audience and the physi-
cal limitations of the radio spectrum. The Red Lion Court quoted Associ-
ated Press: "'Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by pri-
vate interests. "88
In Tornillo, the Court was not concerned by the lack of access to a
limited medium. This was in spite of strong evidence that concentrated
ownership of the press had virtually eliminated competition. Many cities
have only one local newspaper but most communities are served by sev-
82. Id. at 20.
83. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84. Id. at 256.
85. 395 U.S. 367(1969).
86. Id. at 389.
87. Id. at 391.
88. Id. at 392 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
Washington Law Review
eral television and radio stations. Yet the Tornillo Court, unlike the Red
Lion Court, did not give any weight to the reader's right to know or the
speaker's right to access when press outlets are limited.
To understand the Supreme Court's disparate treatment of first amend-
ment rights in these cases, the circumstances of each case must be ana-
lyzed. In Tornillo, although the opportunity for new newspapers was lim-
ited, the limited availability of newspaper outlets was the result of natural
economic forces, rather than of governmental restrictions. 89 In broadcast-
ing, however, the limited competition is the result of governmental re-
strictions on the number of outlets due to radio spectrum limitations. Any
person has the right to publish printed material without any significant
government restriction although competition and other economic factors
(for example, the large initial investment required) may limit the number
of economically viable publications in a given area or on a particular sub-
ject. Because these limitations are the result of the marketplace rather
than government action, government intervention to protect readers'
rights is not justified. In contrast, the limited number of broadcast outlets
is the result of governmentally imposed limits and generally is not the
result of marketplace forces. 90
An additional distinction between the print and broadcast media is that
the print media do not use a public resource as a transmission medium.
Since broadcasters use a valuable public resource-the radio spectrum-
they must behave as trustees: "It does not violate the First Amendment to
treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as
proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and at-
tention to matters of great public concern." 9 1 Another possible reason for
the disparate treatment of the two media under the first amendment is the
reverence given to the press in the United States as the basic vehicle for
"diverse and antagonistic voices." Twentieth century technologies, such
as broadcasting and cable, offer the courts and Congress an opportunity to
89. Many communities can economically support only one daily newspaper. However, a wide
variety of other publications circulate: national newspapers, regional newspapers. weekly newspa-
pers, national news and specialty magazines, and trade publications, to name a few. See, e.g., Lipp-
man, Journal Papers Will Go Daily in September, WASHINGTON POST. Aug. 5, 1981, at 1. col. 3.
90. The D.C. Circuit has recognized this distinction between Red Lion and Tornillo. The court
said: "[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify
even limited government intrusion into the first Amendment rights of the conventional press, see
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo .. " Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC. 567 F.2d 9. 46
(D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In a dictum, the court in Home Bor Office refused to
apply to cable the first amendment analysis developed in Red Lion for broadcasting because -'an
essential precondition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role
for government-is absent." Id. at 44-45. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the Tornillo analy-
sis for newspapers may also not be appropriate. Id. at 46 n.82.
91. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 394.
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reevaluate how to attain the goals of the first amendment without altering
the special status of newspapers under the Constitution.
In summary, the primary reason for treating the two media differently
is the degree of government and public involvement in each. In the print
media, where the degree of competition and the number of outlets is the
result of natural market forces and those outlets can operate without a
special governmentally conferred benefit, the Court generally has not al-
lowed regulation of the outlet's content. In broadcasting, where the de-
gree of competition and number of outlets is the direct result of govern-
ment control and those outlets can only operate by using a public
resource, the Court has permitted some limited control of content.
b. The Cable Model
The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on how the first amendment
applies to cable. 92 The Court has held, however, that cable is engaged in
interstate communications by wire or radio and that the FCC has authority
to regulate cable as "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation of broadcast
television under the Communications Act of 1934. 93 The FCC has im-
posed restraints upon cable similar to those the Court refused to apply to
newspapers in Tornillo. The FCC determines which broadcast signals a
cable system must carry and applies virtually the same fairness, equal
time, and personal attack regulations to cablecasting as govern broadcast-
ing. 94
In addition to the historical links between broadcasting and cable, the
Red Lion and Tornillo analyses suggest that cable should be accorded
treatment for exclusively controlled programming similar to that of
broadcasting rather than that of newspapers under the first amendment.
Unlike newspapers, cable depends on government for its existence. Fed-
eral rules and statutes establish specific market opportunities and advan-
tages for cable. 95 At the local level, cable would not exist without a grant
of authority to use the public right-of-way. In most cases, as a result of a
combination of technological factors, physical availability of pole space,
the need to use the public right-of-way, and the economics of the market,
92. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
93. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
94. See note 19 supra for a list of the regulations applied by the FCC to cable.
95. For example, in 1978 Congress added a new section to the Communications Act of 1934 by
the Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 35 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 224 (Supp. III 1979)), to regulate cable attachments to utility poles in part "to minimize the
effect of unjust or unreasonable pole attachment practices on the wider development of cable televi-
sion service to the public." S. RaP. No. 95-580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 109, 122.
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only one cable system can exist. 96 Local government has the authority to
select the operator of that system on the basis of the community's needs
through a franchise agreement.
Government regulation of the cable monopoly is lawful at the federal
level under the Communications Act of 1934 and at the state or local level
under police powers. 97 Government may regulate to protect the public
interest (for example, to insure adequate service or reasonable access to
the system or to prevent monopoly profits) or to allocate a limited public
resource (such as pole and underground space). Thus, the conceptual
basis for first amendment standards for cablecasting is similar to that for
broadcasting. A broadcaster can speak only if the government grants the
broadcaster a license to use the radio spectrum. Similarly, a cable opera-
tor can speak only if the government grants the operator a license to use
the limited public right-of-way. 98 For first amendment purposes, cable
should be treated like broadcasting when the cable operator is performing
those functions, such as origination programming, that are similar to
broadcasting.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ACCESS
Affirmative government action to facilitate expression has emerged in
the last forty years as one of the most significant first amendment issues. 99
The Supreme Court's statement in Red Lion, reemphasized in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 100 that "it is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount," is as
relevant for cable as it was for broadcasting. This section develops the
argument that the right of access to cable systems is essential for cable to
achieve its full potential as a medium for free expression. Cable access
differs from access to other media and reasonable cable access require-
ments are consistent with fundamental principles of free expression.
96. See note 60 supra; text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
97. See notes 5-9 supra; notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
98. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981). the Court stated: "A
licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public
domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.'" Id. at 2829
(quoting United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). Such language fits
the circumstances of a cable operator as easily as a broadcaster.
99. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941); L. TRIBE, AIERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 693 (1978).
100. 101 S. Ct. 2813, 2829 (1981) (emphasis omitted).
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A. Justification for Access
The principle that a multiplicity of outlets permits robust expression' 01
argues for a multiplicity of voices free from operator control on the single
cable system in a community. In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 102 the
FCC determined that the radio marketplace has enough licensees to pro-
vide diverse expression and entertainment without specific government
regulation of programming formats. Each radio station in a community is
owned, operated, and controlled by a licensee unaffiliated with any other
radio station in that community. In contrast, each community with a cable
system has only one licensee, who operates the only entrance to the cable
marketplace. Having designated the gatekeeper, the government-
whether federal, state, or local-must assume responsibility for insuring
that the gatekeeper serves the community's interests by opening that gate
on a nondiscriminatory basis to a variety of speakers. Then the commu-
nity should not significantly control what those speakers say once they
enter. 103
Moreover, the local cable company has ample opportunity to express
opinions, present information, and select entertainment. For example, on
a thirty-six channel cable system with six channels reserved for access
and ten "must carry" broadcast station signals, the operator has 480 chan-
nel hours per day to program as the operator sees fit. In Columbia Broad-
casting System, the Supreme Court held that reasonable statutory broad-
cast access rights for political candidates do not impair the discretion of
broadcasters. Similarly, reasonable access requirements do not impair the
discretion of cable operators "to present their views on any issue or to
carry any particular type of programming."' 04
Columbia Broadcasting System reaffirms the validity of government
regulation that balances the first amendment rights of various interests.
Cable access requirements imposed by a local government as a condition
for the grant of a monopoly franchise and structured like the access statute
101. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978); Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
102. 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981). NCTA cites this case to support the proposition that the best guar-
antee of diversity and freedom of information is to eliminate government regulation in the communi-
cations marketplace. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 118-19.
103. There are some limited exceptions to the proscription of government control of speech.
Regulation of obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973), and prohibition of
broadcasting lottery information, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1976), are two examples.
104. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 101 S. Ct. at 2830. Cable operators also argue that they need
absolute control over all of a cable system's channels for financial reasons. This need has not been
established. In fact, the skyrocketing value of cable systems and the fierce competition for franchises,
even in cities with extensive access requirements, suggest strongly that total control of all channels is
not necessary for financial viability. See text accompanying note 132 infra.
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at issue in Columbia Broadcasting System create limited but reasonable
rights to access, not a general right of access to any channel at any time.
In so doing, these requirements balance the first amendment rights of the
viewers with the economic interests and first amendment rights of the
cable operator. 105
General communications policies, as well as the first amendment, jus-
tify cable access. 106 Cable can provide competition and diversity in com-
munications services. Cable channels used for the one-way or two-way
transmission of data or voices will perform a valuable local communica-
tions service now largely monopolized by the local telephone company.
While a cable system is not likely to be a substitute for the local telephone
network, it can perform certain local two-way communications more effi-
ciently than the telephone system, such as communications between a
central location and multiple terminals. 107
If competition and diversity in communications services are desirable,
this alternative local communications medium should be available for the
widest possible public use. But the cable operator, left to his or her own
discretion, will have little incentive to lease two-way channels to poten-
tial competitors on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. For example,
a cable operator with a financial interest in a security service provided
over its cable system may be unwilling to lease channel capacity to a local
burglar alarm company or may charge a discriminatory rate. A cable sys-
tem's leased channel service need not be subjected to common carrier-
type regulation to achieve equitable results. A reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory rate and service access requirement applicable to all types of services
would insure that the local cable system is used for the benefit of all citi-
zens and is available to growing and diverse communications services.
105. Implementing the principle of access can be left to the states and their instrumentalities.
Allowing states or local governments to establish access requirements comports with the tenth
amendment concept of federalism. "The essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.'" Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418. 431 (1979).
106. The justification for access extends beyond first amendment considerations to public poli-
cies such as those embodied in the antitrust statutes. For example, leased access requirements can
prevent a cable operator from monopolizing interactive services such as security systems, banking. or
data base access. See Channel 100, Toledo, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision Corp., No. 80-40071 (E.D.
Mich. May 5, 1980) (order granting preliminary injunction), where a preliminary injunction was
issued preventing the cable system from evicting a channel lessee. See also Barnett. Cable Television
and Media Concentration, 22 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1970).
107. For example, Manhattan Cable Television plans to transmit data between the municipal
building and nine New York City municipal computer service centers using its coaxial cable rather
than leased telephone lines. See CABLEVISION, July 20, 1981, at 12. Also, local cable channels will be
used in connection with a switched digital data network being developed by Tymnet, Inc. and Satel-
lite Business Systems for communications between New York City and San Francisco.
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B. Lack ofDanger in Access Requirements
The National Cable Television Association argues that cable access re-
quirements are dangerous for the media.108 It lists a series of dangers
which apply, if at all, to newspapers and broadcasting and then fails to
show how cable may be subject to these dangers. It is inappropriate to
presume that potential dangers associated with print and broadcast access
automatically apply to cable system access. One commentator who has
explicitly assessed the potential harms and benefits of cable access regula-
tion has concluded that the competing values of minimizing government
intervention and insuring equal opportunity for expression can be recon-
ciled through regulating cable access. 109
A review of NCTA's list of "potential dangers" will clarify the debate.
The first danger, as described by Professor Tribe, discussing access re-
quirements in the media, is "'deterring those items of coverage that will
trigger duties of affording access at the media's expense."' 0, 0 This is not
relevant to cable access requirements because requiring leased and local
cable access is not contingent on a trigger event. Access requirements do
not depend on how a cable company uses other channels or on the content
of programs on those channels. For example, cable access does not re-
quire that a cable company carrying one news service provide channels to
all other news services. Instead, it requires merely that the company make
channels available for others to use as they wish. Cable access, unlike
newspaper or broadcast access, does not encourage cable operators to
self-censor or to "conclude that the safe course is to avoid contro-
versy."" I
The second suggested danger is "'inviting manipulation of media by
whichever bureaucrats are entrusted to assure access."'12 The govern-
ment's role, however, in insuring nondiscriminatory access to the com-
munity's cable system resembles its role in adopting reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations for other forms of expression. 113 In these
other roles, the danger of government "manipulating the media" is not
108. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147.
109. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation
ofthe Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1976).
110. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
697 (1978)).
111. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257.
112. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
697 (1978)).
113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) ("ITihe government may adopt reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in order to
further an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of communication"); Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
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outweighed by the value in reasonable regulation. When a citizen uses a
public resource for an expressive purpose, the government may insure
that the citizen does so in an orderly fashion, with minimal intrusion on
the first amendment rights of other citizens. 114 The benefits from access,
in facilitating rational and fair opportunities to communicate through ca-
ble, far outweigh any potential abuse. A government access channel, for
example, promotes the important goals of conducting government in the
open" 15 and of "enhancing the ability of... the public to receive informa-
tion necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process."" 16
The manipulative bureaucrat has not emerged in cable access require-
ments. No case of actual abuse or of any significant problem associated
with access regulations has arisen anywhere in the country. Moreoever,
most cities have established access plans that are free of any administra-
tive discretion. Such plans commonly provide nondiscriminatory guide-
lines to qualify for access, insulate supervision of access channels from
government influence (except government access channels)," 7 and estab-
lish separate noncompeting categories for access. 118 A cable system oper-
ator's discretion in providing additional access through its own channels
is unaffected.
NCTA suggests a third danger, "'escalating from access regulation to
much more dubious exercises of government control.' "119 This allegation
is irrelevant to access regulations, which are based on structure rather
than on content. 120 Requiring access does not give the government the
114. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (anti-handbill ordinance was invalid as
applied to labor, religious, and political pamphleteering despite the state's legitimate purpose of min-
imizing litter, noise, and traffic congestion and protecting people from fraud and invasion of privacy)
with Reynolds v. Tennessee, 414 U.S. 1163 (1974) (the Court refused to review a conviction, under a
statute prohibiting disturbance of religious assemblies, for chanting during the President's speech at a
religious gathering).
115. Cf.. e.g.. Government in the Sunshine Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976), Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (federal open government laws).
116. Columbia Broadcasting Svs.. 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
117. See note 121 infra.
118. For example, an access agreement will have different access requirements for community.
educational, leased. government, and two-way access.
119. NCTA Report, supra note 2. at 147 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTtTtrioNAL LAW
697 (1978)).
120. The FCC has sanctioned this concept of structural rather than content based regulation of
cable television. It recently reaffirmed its policy of not applying the fairness doctrine and equal op-
portunities for political candidates rules to access programming, "as long as the channels on which
such programming is presented themselves have inherent in their functioning, access of a type which
makes possible equal opportunities for political candidates and time for the provision of programming
covering all sides of controversial issues of public importance." Cable TV Access Channel Rules. 83
F.C.C.2d 147. 148 (1980).
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opportunity to interfere with program selection and program content on
access channels. 121
Significant access opportunities-community, educational, govern-
mental, and commercially leased-and increased cable coverage and
penetration should decrease rather than increase the need for federal ca-
blecasting rules such as equal time, fairness, and right of reply. Develop-
ing alternative opportunities for electronic expression may even eliminate
the need for such rules (or "regulatory impediments" as NCTA character-
izes them). 122 Until those alternatives exist, however, "impediments"
must be distinguished from access opportunities. NCTA cites practical
considerations such as burdensome recordkeeping requirements and in-
trusive government enforcement as reasons for avoiding content regula-
tion. Access arrrangements have none of these problems. If, as NCTA
suggests, a cable system with 100 channels has 2,400 hours of program
transmission time per day, 123 reserving some of these channels for access
is a reasonable and minimally burdensome means of protecting citizens'
first amendment rights. 124 If Congress and the Supreme Court affirm gov-
ernment's authority to guarantee the availability of adequate access chan-
nels on all cable systems, then perhaps content regulations, such as the
fairness doctrine and equal time, may be eliminated or made less burden-
some.
C. Voluntary Contractual Obligations and the First Amendment
Most local governments continue to require access channels in the
franchise agreement. 125 Although cable operators voluntarily commit
themselves to providing access in these franchise agreements, the NCTA
criticizes such access requirements as unconstitutionally conditioning en-
joyment of a state granted privilege on relinquishing first amendment
rights. 126 This argument, however, ignores the many cases that uphold
121. If an access channel is dedicated to government use, the government may exclude others
from using that channel and control the content. This limited direct government use of cable is consis-
tent with the first amendment, which allows the government to "add its own voice to the many that it
must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 590 (1978).
122. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 150.
123. Id.
124. Access requirements may even benefit the cable company. NCTA notes the valuable mar-
keting role access plays. NCTA Report (original unpublished version to Senator Packwood), supra
note 2, at 31 n.95. See note 131 and accompanying text infra.
125. The FCC's access requirements were held to be void in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689 (1979). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
126. NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)).
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state regulation even when it curtails the exercise of constitutional
rights. 127
This article has argued that access provisions in a franchise agreement
do not violate the first amendment rights of cable operators. 128 Although
requiring the operator to reserve some channels for public access may
possibly affect the operator's profit potential, that is not sufficient to jus-
tify prohibiting municipal regulation of a business activity in which the
public has a substantial interest. 129
Local governments typically require access channels in the franchise
agreements by stating these and other requirements in a request for pro-
posals and including these obligations in the final franchise agreement.
As of March, 1981, according to NCTA, more than 1,018 access chan-
nels were operating. The cable industry recognizes the utility of free pub-
lic access channels "as a marketing technique to gain consumer accep-
tance and expand market penetration.' ' 130 Cable companies continue to
bid for franchises, promising substantial commitments to access and fre-
quently offering more access channels than required. 131 Even in Boston,
where proposed access requirements are among the most demanding, two
cable companies conducted a fierce battle for the franchise. 132
127. See notes 135-145 and accompanying text infra.
128. The first amendment prohibits governmentally sanctioned distinctions based on the content
of speech. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976). Access provisions in a franchise agree-
ment, however, are content neutral. See text accompanying notes 110-124 supra. A local govern-
ment does not tell the cable operator what messages to carry on the access channels. The cable opera-
tor is simply required to make channels available to those who want to convey a message. Cases such
as Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). in which the
government abridged individual freedom of expression by imposing sanctions based solely on the
content of constitutionally protected speech, do not apply to content neutral requirements. See also
FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 773.799-800 (1978).
129. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 49 n.97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S.
829 (1977). Cf. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 11 (1195 1)
(fact that insurance regulation, which requires insurance companies to insure certain high risk per-
sons. may diminish company profits does not render regulation an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty). Cable operators' dedication of some channels solely to nonexpressive purposes. such as busi-
ness data transmission, security monitoring, and banking, challenges NCTA's arguments that the
cable operator's freedom of expression will be unconstitutionally limited if the operator is faced with
any regulation which intrudes on the operator's content discretion. NCTA's real concern appears to
be that access requirements might interfere with a cable operator's ability to allow access only to the
most lucrative lease customers.
130. NCTA Report (original unpublished version to Senator Packwood). supra note 2. at 31
n.95.
131. For example, Cox Cable recently agreed to provide $450,000 annually for public access in
New Orleans and more when the company increases rates. New Orleans and Cox Sign Franchise
Pact, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 27. 1981, at 11.
132. Competition for Boston Franchise Grows Fierce and Furious, CABLEISION. July 6. 198 1.
at 12.
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To the extent that access requirements involve first amendment rights
of the cable operator, the parties to a cable franchise agreement-freely
entered into by each party for mutual benefit-may limit the operator's
first amendment rights in return for the benefits of the franchise. A funda-
mental principle of contract law allows competent parties to contract to
perform or abstain from a course of conduct and to manage their affairs in
their own way unless grounds for judicial interference are very clear. 133 A
cable company has no opportunity to exercise any first amendment rights
in a community until it is awarded a cable franchise. The franchise gives
the cable company the ability and the right to express itself without gov-
ernment interference. In exchange for this right, the cable operator may
voluntarily and constitutionally agree to allocate some channels for access
in consideration for the franchise so that the first amendment rights of
others will be enhanced. 134
Agreements which limit the constitutional rights of one or both parties
are often valid. For example, a prospective employee of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency must sign a contract which requires that the employee
submit any proposed publication for prior review. 135 Other cases have
upheld agreements waiving various constitutional rights, including cer-
tain procedural due process rights, 136 eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity, 137 the right to be present at a trial,138 the right to a jury trial, 139
and the right to be free from warrantless searches. 140 Similarly, a cable
operator's agreement to dedicate a portion of the community's cable sys-
tem for public access is lawful. The franchising authority is simply con-
tracting to protect substantial community and public interests 141 by re-
quiring access channels as one term of the franchise contract. 142
Even without an express agreement, a party's acceptance of a public
133. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1928); Doctor Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1376 n. 16 (1962).
134. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 101 S. Ct. at 2829, quoted in note 98 supra; Illinois
Broadcasting Co. v. City of Decatur, 96 Ill. App. 2d 454, 238 N.E.2d 261 (1968).
135. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). The Supreme Court sanctioned this provision
and noted: "Moreover, this Court's cases make clear that-even in the absence of an express agree-
ment-the CIA could have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable
restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment."
Id. at 509 n.3.
136. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
137. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
138. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
139. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
140. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
141. See part II.B. supra.
142. The cable industry cites Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), for the proposi-
tion that the state "may not impose conditions [on the grant of a privilege] which will require the
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benefit, such as a franchise agreement, may operate as an implied waiver
of constitutional rights, particularly if infringing on those rights is neces-
sary to protect the public interest served by granting the benefit. Restric-
tions on political activity that would otherwise be protected by the first
amendment may be imposed on federal employees,1 43 as may restrictions
on the rights of military personnel to petition the government. 144 It is well
settled that a statute imposing a minimal burden on first amendment rights
will be upheld if it furthers an important purpose within the state's regula-
tory powers. 145 Mandating reasonable access to a limited number of cable
system channels is not intruding on the cable operator's own freedom of
speech and upholds an important public interest in furthering the ability of
others to speak. Access requirements are a reasonable means of insuring
that a community's cable system will operate in the public interest with
minimal government regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cable provides an increasing variety of communications services; it is
much more than just "cable television." Cable today carries broadcast
television signals, nonbroadcast television signals, and local cablecast
and access programming. It also offers informational services, data ser-
vices, and two-way communications which will increase substantially as
information retrieval and interactive systems are fully developed.
For first amendment purposes, cable is a unique communications me-
dium, fulfulling several significant, different communications functions
simultaneously. The first amendment requires evaluating cable on a func-
tion-by-function basis according to the nature of the communication and
the degree of control over content exercised by the cable operator. Func-
tionally, some channels are much like common carrier services, where
relinquishment of constitutional rights." NCTA Report, supra note 2, at 156. The validity of Frost in
light of the undoubted constitutionality of the Communications Act of 1934. which conditions the
grant of a broadcast license on a number of public interest requirements, including access require-
ments that limit a broadcaster's first amendment rights, is questionable. See FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1 978), which upheld FCC rules preventing those acquiring a
broadcast license from owning a newspaper in the same community. See generally Parden v. Termi-
nal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 193 n. 11 (1964) (distinguished Frost on the ground that the condition sought
to be imposed there was outside the scope of the municipality's regulatory power): Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 82 n.3 (1955) (Frankfurter. J.. concurring) (suggesting
Frost may have little survival value); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 328 F.2d
165, 173 (9th Cir. 1964) (plaintiff was required to accept a power license "upon such terms as Con-
gress has determined should be imposed in the public interest").
143. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers. 413 U.S. 548
(1973).
144. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
145. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37.51 (1971).
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the cable operator has no control over content. On other channels the
cable operator merely selects the general type of information or program-
ming to be transmitted but does not control the content. The third func-
tional category includes channels that are similar to broadcasting where
the cable operator has exclusive control.
The cable system operator has no first amendment rights in the no-con-
trol channels. The other two channel categories raise questions about the
first amendment rights of the subscriber and the community as well as
rights of the cable operator. A community served by a single high-capac-
ity distribution cable system can protect its citizens' first amendment
rights without unduly hampering those of the cable operator. The cable
operator may transmit whatever programming and information the opera-
tor believes appropriate, subject only to carrying those broadcast signals
the federal government believes necessary to protect over-the-air broad-
casting and carrying any additional signals the local government believes
necessary to protect the first amendment rights of the community's citi-
zens. Other potential cable system users must also have reasonable access
to this conduit to insure that it distributes a multiplicity of voices, ideas,
and information. Indeed, while the cable operator enjoys an economic
monopoly in operating the conduit, the operator has no monopoly rights
that the first amendment protects. Government regulatory requirements,
which need not be complex or burdensome, are necessary to balance the
community's interests in reasonable diversity and public access against
the potential dangers associated with monopoly control of the system by
the operator.
The cable industry suggests that cable is an electronic newspaper enti-
tled to the same protection under the first amendment as the printed press.
Such a unitary classification of cable is not only self-serving but illogical.
The cable operator does not perform the same editorial role as a newspa-
per editor. The cable operator may exert full editorial control over some
channels of the system but even in this role the operator is more like a
broadcaster than a newspaper editor.
Unlike a newspaper, the cable operator distributes a valuable and lim-
ited public resource through a pipeline that uses the public right-of-way.
Cable is a natural monopoly, in some respects like a utility. Substitutes
for various services provided over a given channel of the system may
exist in the community, but there is only one cable pipeline, with vast
capacity and service diversity potential, and consequent economic advan-
tage. A government franchise effectively gives a system operator a de
facto monopoly. This alone justifies different first amendment treatment
from the print media which experiences intense marketplace competition.
Cable performs important functions similar to broadcasting. Yet cable
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need not be regulated like broadcasting, with each cablecast channel sub-
jected to broadcast-like content regulation. A regulated system of reason-
able access which gives expression to multiple community views could
eliminate the need for broadcast-type regulation of cable.
Cable is a unique communications medium. It and its multiple func-
tions in a community should be so treated under the first amendment.
Sweeping constitutional generalities oversimplify cable's problems, deni-
grate the first amendment rights of others in communities it serves, and
ignore all the government experience with cable at the federal, state and
local levels.
